Bank Concentration: Chile and International Comparisons by Ross Levine
Banco Central de Chile
Documentos de Trabajo
 




BANK CONCENTRATION: CHILE AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Ross Levine
                                                
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia
impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se
pueden hacer por fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@condor.bcentral.cl
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Hard copy versions can be ordered individually
for US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2)
6702231 or email: bcch@condor.bcentral.clBANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
La serie Documentos de Trabajo es una publicación del Banco Central de Chile que divulga
los trabajos de investigación económica realizados por profesionales de esta institución o
encargados por ella a terceros. El objetivo de la serie es aportar al debate de tópicos
relevantes y presentar nuevos enfoques en el análisis de los mismos. La difusión de los
Documentos de Trabajo sólo intenta facilitar el intercambio de ideas y dar a conocer
investigaciones, con carácter preliminar, para su discusión y comentarios.
La publicación de los Documentos de Trabajo no está sujeta a la aprobación previa de los
miembros del Consejo del Banco Central de Chile. Tanto el contenido de los Documentos
de Trabajo, como también los análisis y conclusiones que de ellos se deriven, son de
exclusiva responsabilidad de su(s) autor(es) y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión del
Banco Central de Chile o de sus Consejeros.
The Working Papers series of the Central Bank of Chile disseminates economic research
conducted by Central Bank staff or third parties under the sponsorship of the Bank. The
purpose of the series is to contribute to the discussion of relevant issues and develop new
analytical or empirical approaches in their analysis. The only aim of the Working Papers is
to disseminate preliminary research for its discussion and comments.
Publication of Working Papers is not subject to previous approval by the members of the
Board of the Central Bank. The views and conclusions presented in the papers are
exclusively those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Central
Bank of Chile or of the Board members.
Documentos de Trabajo del Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers of the Central Bank of Chile
Huérfanos 1175, primer piso.
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475   Fax: (56-2) 6702231Documentos de Trabajo Working Paper
N° 62 N° 62




Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
Resumen
¿Existe a nivel internacional una relación negativa entre concentración bancaria y las características
del mercado bancario y financiero?. Este trabajo encuentra que la respuesta es “no”. No se observa
una asociación entre el grado de concentración bancaria y resultados negativos, en términos del
nivel de desarrollo del sistema financiero, del grado de competencia dentro de la industria, de la
integridad del sistema legal y político, del crecimiento económico y de la fragilidad del sector
bancario. Además, este estudio muestra que (1) Chile no se caracteriza internacionalmente por tener
un sistema bancario concentrado y (2) el grado de concentración bancaria en Chile ha cambiado
significativamente poco durante los últimos 16 años.
Abstract
Is banking sector concentration associated with negative outcomes internationally?  This paper finds
that the answer is “no.” Greater bank concentration is not strongly associated with negative
outcomes in terms of financial sector development, industrial competition, political and legal
system integrity, economic growth, or banking sector fragility.  The paper also shows that (1) Chile
does not standout as having a particularly concentrated banking system, and (2) Chilean bank
concentration has changed remarkably little over the last 16 year.
_______________________
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With the recent purchase of Banco Santiago by Banco Santander, the issue of
banking sector concentration has stepped into Chile’s policy spotlight.  This short paper
uses newly compiled data on a cross-section of countries to address the question: Is
banking sector concentration associated with negative outcomes internationally? I also
present information on how Chile compares internationally and the evolution of bank
concentration in Chile since 1983.
In terms of international comparisons, the paper asks: do countries with more
concentrated banking systems (as measured by the share of the loan market controlled by
the three largest banks) have:
1. More poorly functioning financial systems, i.e.,
• Greater net interest income as a share of total assets
• Greater overhead expenses as a share of total assets
• Smaller overall banking systems
• Less liquid equity markets
2. Less competitive industrial sectors, i.e.,
• Greater market domination by a few firms
• Less effective anti-trust procedures
• Less competitive business climate2
3. Less effective political and legal system, i.e.,
• Greater corruption
• Less adherence to the rule of law
• Worse tax compliance
4. Slower economic growth and Greater bank fragility
The simple answer to each of the above questions is “no.” Greater bank
concentration is not strongly associated with negative outcomes in terms of financial
sector development, industrial competition, political and legal system integrity, economic
growth, or banking sector fragility.   Looking at a broad cross-section of 66 countries
over the 1980-95 period, one does not observe a strong relationship between bank
concentration and many variables of interest.  While one may question the accuracy of
the underlying data, all of the comparisons point in the same direction.  From
international comparisons, it would be very difficult to argue that greater concentration
per se is necessarily bad (or good) for financial development, industrial competition,
political integrity, economic growth, or financial stability.
Chile does not standout.  In the 66 country data set, Chile’s level of banking
sector concentration of 0.49 over the 1980-95 period is below the sample mean of 0.67
and the sample median of 0.72.   Furthermore, the level of banking sector concentration
in Chile has not changed much since 1983.  There has been little variation in3
concentration over the last 16 years.  Using data available from the Banco Central de
Chile, the concentration level in 1999 was slightly lower than in 1983.
The evidence in this short paper does not imply that concentration is an
unimportant issue for Chilean policy makers.  Banking sector concentration is influenced
by many factors.  Furthermore, the effects of concentration on an economy and the
political system depend on many country-specific factors.  This paper’s message does not
cover these critical relationships.  Rather, this short paper simply shows that (1) there is
not a simple relationship between banking concentration and financial development,
industrial competition, the political and legal environment, economic growth, and
financial fragility, (2) Chile does not standout as having a particularly concentrated
banking system, and (3) Chilean bank concentration has changed remarkably little over
the last 16 years.
A. Data
The underlying data are taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999).
As indicated above, I organize the data into four groups: (1) measures of financial
development and concentration (2) measures of industrial competition, (3) measures of
the political and legal environment, and (4) measures of economic growth and banking
sector fragility.  The specific variables are as follows.4
A.1. Financial Development and Concentration
Concentration equals the share of total loans of the three largest banks and is the
average value over the 1990-95 period.   This variable captures the degree of
concentration in the banking industry.  I also used such measures as the number of banks
per capita and the share of total assets of the single largest bank.   These alternative
measures produced similar results, however.
Very Concentrated equals 1 if Concentration is more than two standard
deviations above the sample mean, and equals 0 otherwise.  The Jaque-Berra statistics
does not reject the hypothesis that Concentration is normally distributed across countries.
Nonetheless, there may exist concerns that extreme concentration is particularly
threatening to competition, efficiency, and economic performance.
Net Interest Margin equals net income divided by total assets and is the
average value over the 1990-95 period.  While recognizing that many factors influence
interest rates besides the degree of efficiency of bank operations, I include this measure
because of its wide use in the literature.
Overhead Costs equals overhead expenditures as a share of total bank assets
and is also averaged over the 1990-95 period.  Again, overhead expenditures are not
necessarily a sign of inefficiency.  Nonetheless, particularly large values may signal a
lack of competition.
Bank Credit equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and
as a share of GDP and is the average value over the 1980-95 period.  This is a general and
widely used measure of banking sector development.  I also used such other measures as:
(a) a broad measure of intermediary development that also includes claims by non-5
deposit money banks on the private sector, (b) liquid liabilities, and (c) total assets of the
commercial banking sector relative to GDP in 1997.  These alternative measures do not
alter any of the conclusions, however.
Total Value Traded equals the value of domestic equities traded on domestic
exchanges divided by GDP.  This is averaged over the 1980-95 period.   Levine and
Zervos (1998, June AER) show that stock market liquidity is important for economic
growth. I also considered the variable Nonbank Credits, which equals nonbank financial
institution claims on the private nonfinancial sector as a share of GDP and is the average
value over the 1980-95 period.  This gave the same results as total value traded.
A.2. Industrial Competition
No Market Domination is based upon a survey question in which respondents
indicate the degree to which they agree with the following statement: “market domination
is not common in your country.”   I also examined the percentage of economic activity
controlled by the 30 largest companies.  This alternative measure produced similar
results, however.
Effective Anti-Trust is based upon survey questions in which respondents
indicate the degree to which they believe the anti-trust laws of a country operate
effectively and fairly.  Greater values signify that anti-trust laws are perceived to work
more effectively.
Business is Competitive is based upon a survey question in which respondents
indicate the degree to which they believe the business environment is free and
competitive.6
A.3. Political and Legal Environment
Integrity (less corruption) is an indicator of the degree of corruption in
government and society at large.  Greater values signify less corruption, or greater
integrity.
Rule of Law is an indicator of the degree to which the country adheres to the rule
of law.
Tax Compliance is an indicator of the degree to which society complies with tax
laws.
A.4. Growth and Stability
Economic Growth equals real per capita GDP growth from 1980-95.
Banking Crisis equals the Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) indicator of systemic
banking crises except for the following adjustment.  First, I expanded it to include
countries that experienced major, though perhaps not systemic, banking crises over the
1985-97 period.  This results in the addition of: Canada (15 members of Canadian
Deposit Insurance Company failed), Denmark (cumulative loses of 9 percent of loans),
Hong Kong (9 out of 18 banks failed over the period), India (nonperforming loans
estimated as 16 percent of total loans), Italy (58 banks accounting for 11 percent of total
loans were forcibly merged), and the United States (estimated savings and loan clean-up
costs of 3.2 percent of GDP).  Second, I exclude two countries (Israel and Spain) from
the Caprio/Klingebiel list of systemic banking crises because their crises occurred in the
late 1970s and therefore are outside our sample period.7
B. Analysis: Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the data.  It also lists the values of Chile.
Chilean bank concentration is below the international average.  Specifically,
Chile’s level of banking sector concentration of 0.49 is substantially below the sample of
mean of 0.67 and the sample median of 0.72.  Thus, bank concentration in Chile is not a
defining feature in the internationally.
Chilean bank efficiency and size are close to the sample mean, while stock market
trading as a share of GDP is below the sample average and bit below the sample median.
While Chile is about average in terms of perceived market domination and the
effectiveness of anti-trust laws, it ranks very highly in terms of the freedom to compete in
the business arena.  Nonetheless, corruption is more of a problem in Chile than it might
hope for in the long-run.
C.   Analysis: Correlations and Regressions
This section assesses the relationship between banking sector concentration and
(1) measures of financial development, (2) measures of industrial competition, (3)
measures of the political and legal environment, and (4) measures of economic growth
and banking sector fragility.  I first compiled simple correlations and evaluated the
significance of these correlations.  Table 2 presents the correlations.  In the regressions, I
control for the overall level of economic development (the logarithm of real per capita8
GDP in 1980).  I use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  The regressions are
presented in a series of appendices since they do not add much to the correlations.
Concentration is not significantly related to measures of financial sector
development (Table 2: Panel A).  Concentration is uncorrelated with net interest margins,
bank overhead costs, the size of the banking system, and the degree of stock market
liquidity.  This finding is unchanged when using the Very Concentrated measure of
concentration as shown in the Table 2: Panel A.  The regressions tell the same story.
Appendix A shows that banking sector concentration does not enter any of the
regressions significantly at the 0.10 level after controlling for the level of economic
development.    While it seems natural to assume that great concentration implies less
competition and less efficient banks, the international comparisons do not support this
view.  The degree of market contestability – along with the degree of market
concentration – appear to be the realizations of complex interactions among various
policy and market conditions.  There is not a simple link between concentration and
efficiency.  In sum, banking sector concentration is not significantly related to net interest
margins, overhead costs, bank credit, or stock market liquidity
Concentration is not significantly related to measures of industrial competition
(Table 2: Panel B).  There is little correlation between banking sector concentration and
the degree of industrial market domination, the effectiveness of anti-trust laws, or the
freedom to compete economically.  Again, the Very Concentrated measure of bank
concentration yields the same findings.  The regressions in Appendix B confirm these9
results after controlling for the level of economic development.  Many observers note that
greater bank concentration will produce greater industrial concentration, and therefore a
less competitive economy, international comparisons with existing – albeit flawed data –
do not validate these concerns.  Banking sector concentration is not significantly related
to measures of the degree of industrial competition.
Concentration is not negatively associated with the integrity of the political and legal
environment (Table 2: Panel C).  Countries with greater concentration do not have lower
tax compliance.  Countries with greater concentration do not less efficient legal systems.
Indeed, greater concentration is positively associated with integrity; i.e., more
concentration is negatively associated with corruption.  These findings are confirmed by
the regression estimates in Appendix C that control for the level of real per capita GDP.
Observers note that greater bank concentration will corrupt the political and legal
environment.  There is little evidence of this, however, in the international cross-section
of countries.  The positive relationship between integrity and concentration should not be
interpreted as implying that concentration lowers corruption.  Indeed, it should be used to
highlight the complex nature of the relationship between concentration and the political
environment.  It may be that less corrupt governments are more likely to open markets
internationally.  A few big international banks may gobble-up a concentrated part of the
financial system.  These banks, however, may be subject to competitive pressures such
that banking sector efficiency does not deteriorate.  This argument is purely speculative
and this paper offers no support for it.  Rather, this paper suggests that calls to limit
banking sector concentration will not find analytical support by simply looking across the10
globe at the links between concentration and the integrity of the political and legal
systems.
Banking sector concentration is not significantly related to economic growth
(Table 2: Panel D).   In terms of the growth, neither the simple correlations nor the
regressions in Appendix D suggest a strong relationship between concentration and
economic growth.
There is some evidence that greater banking sector concentration is significantly
and negatively associated with major banking crises (Table 2: Panel D).  The simple
correlations indicate a negative association between concentration and whether the
country experienced a major banking crisis.  Using a logit regression and controlling for
initial income, the results confirm that countries with more concentrated banking systems
seem to have a lower probability of suffering a systemic banking crises.  This result
disappears, however, when controlling for a broader array of country characteristics
(inflation, openness to international trade, and the size of the government).  In sum there
is not a confident link between concentration and financial fragility.
D.  Discussion of International Comparisons
International comparisons do not suggest that banking sector concentration is
negatively associated with financial development, industrial competition, integrity of the
political and legal systems, overall economic growth, or banking sector fragility.  Further
work is surely needed.  Evidently, the relationship between bank concentration and11
economic development is more complex than one can obtain from simple cross-country
comparisons.  Nevertheless, the data certainly do not support the view that bank
concentration per se is necessarily bad.  Arguments for restricting bank mergers will have
to be supported by something else besides broad international comparisons.
Finally, it should be emphasized that foreign banks can play an important role.
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1998) find that greater foreign bank presence – just the
number of foreign banks, not their share of the market – is negatively associated with
overhead costs and financial fragility.  Thus, concentrated banking system may still be in
highly contestable markets that keep banks efficient and stable.
E. Chile
As noted above, Chile does not have a very concentrated banking sector.  Indeed,
its level of bank concentration is below the international mean.  This section examines
the evolution of bank concentration in Chile since the early 1980s.
Figure 1 shows that banking market concentration in Chile has been fairly
constant over time.  Bank concentration is measured as the percentage of loans (in value
terms) issued by the three largest banks to total loans issued by the banking sector.  The
level of concentration is a bit lower in 1999 (0.41) than it was in 1983 (0.49).
Concentration reached a low in 1995 of about 0.35 before returning to 0.42 in 1997.
Thus, there is no evidence of a sharp increase in Chilean banking sector concentration.12
Further note in Figures 2 – 4 that Chile has experienced considerable financial
development.  These Figures are taken from Francisco Gallego and Norman Loayza
(2000).  Bank activity as a share of GDP has grown, albeit with some variation.  Bank
efficiency has improved over time and past due loans fell since the early 1980s before
rising slightly with the onset of the Asian financial crisis.  Thus, while Chile’s overall
level of financial development has grown, the level of banking sector concentration has
remained fairly constant.  The data do not highlight the need for particular concern
associated with bank concentration in Chile.13
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NET INTEREST OVERHEAD BANK TOTAL VALUE 
CONCENTRATION MARGIN COST CREDIT TRADED
 Mean 0.67 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.12
 Median 0.72 0.03 0.03 0.41 0.06
 Maximum 1.00 0.12 0.12 1.44 0.98
 Minimum 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00
Chile 0.49 0.05 0.03 0.45 0.04Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (continued)
NO MARKET EFFECTIVE  BUSINESS IS INTEGRITY RULE OF ECONOMIC BANKING
DOMINATION ANTI-TRUST COMPETITIVE (LESS CORRUPT) LAW GROWTH CRISIS
 Mean 3.45 4.13 7.23 3.97 3.90 1.72 0.54
 Median 3.44 4.19 7.5 3.76 3.80 1.70 1
 Maximum 4.77 5.47 10 6 6 7.50 1
 Minimum 2.17 2.13 2.5 1.18 1.14 -4.42 0
Chile 3.62 4.71 10 3.18 4.21 3.73 1TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS
Panel A: Financial Intermediary Development and Concentration
VERY
CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATED
(CONCENTRATION > 0.885) N
NET INTEREST 0.01 0.05 59
      MARGIN
OVERHEAD -0.04 -0.06 59
     COST
BANK CREDIT -0.15 -0.22 59
TOTAL VALUE  -0.10 -0.12 54
TRADED
Panel B: Industrial Competition and Bank Concentration
NO MARKET 0.04 -0.16 43
DOMINATION
EFFECTIVE  0.16 0.11 43
ANTI-TRUST
BUSINESS IS 0.18 0.20 43
COMPETITIVE
Note: None of these correlations is significant at the 0.10 level.TABLE 2: CORRELATIONS (continued)
Panel C: Political and Legal Environment and Bank Concentration
VERY
CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATED
(CONCENTRATION > 0.885) N
Integrity (Less Corruption) 0.34 0.04 42
Rule of Law 0.09 -0.02 42
Tax Compliance 0.17 0.00 42
Note: None of these correlations is significant at the 0.10 level.
Panel D: Growth, Crises, and Bank Concentration
Economic Growth -0.19   -0.20   57
Major Banking -0.35   -0.28   57
Crisis
Note The two crises correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.
Note: The two growth correlations are not significant at the 0.10 level.Appendix A: Regressions of Financial Development on Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: NET INTEREST MARGIN
Included observations: 59
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.119362 0.026397 4.521703 0
LRGDPSH -0.00902 0.002594 -3.476793 0.001





White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.097897 0.027745 3.52838 0.0008
LRGDPSH -0.00618 0.002858 -2.162834 0.0348
CONC -0.0097 0.011491 -0.843758 0.4024
R-squared 0.047733
Adjusted R-squared 0.013724Appendix A (continued):  Financial Development on Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: BANK CREDIT
Included observations: 59
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.38551 0.337187 -4.109032 0.0001
LRGDPSH 0.216572 0.036502 5.933134 0
CONC -0.02524 0.136902 -0.184368 0.8544
R-squared 0.390197
Adjusted R-squared 0.368418
Dependent Variable: Total Value Traded
Included observations: 54
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.5312 0.263512 -2.015824 0.0491
LRGDPSH 0.080667 0.028874 2.793806 0.0073
CONC -0.06164 0.092976 -0.662971 0.5103
R-squared 0.153608
Adjusted R-squared 0.120416Appendix B: Industrial Competition and Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: No Market Domination
Included observations: 43
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.300525 1.101642 -0.272797 0.7864
LRGDPSH 0.464264 0.122644 3.785454 0.0005
CONC -0.48226 0.479351 -1.006068 0.3204
R-squared 0.240415
Adjusted R-squared 0.202436
Dependent Variable: Effective Anti-Trust
Included observations: 43
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -2.15387 1.176589 -1.830606 0.0746
LRGDPSH 0.737413 0.129802 5.681054 0
CONC -0.214199 0.521811 -0.410492 0.6836
R-squared 0.459516
Adjusted R-squared 0.432492
Dependent Variable: Business is Competitive
Included observations: 43
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -7.931737 2.661066 -2.980661 0.0049
LRGDPSH 1.803212 0.291666 6.182451 0
CONC -0.200827 0.963201 -0.2085 0.8359
R-squared 0.531564
Adjusted R-squared 0.508142Appendix C: Political/Legal Environment and Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: Integrity (Less Corruption)
Included observations: 42 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -9.468589 1.519614 -6.230915 0
LRGDPSH 1.492369 0.173488 8.602153 0
CONC 1.446893 0.502605 2.878788 0.0064
R-squared 0.756657
Adjusted R-squared 0.744177
Dependent Variable: Rule of Law
Included observations: 42  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.77879 1.802814 -5.978871 0
LRGDPSH 1.772391 0.190135 9.321774 0
CONC -0.470314 0.569616 -0.825669 0.414
R-squared 0.731781
Adjusted R-squared 0.718026
Dependent Variable: Tax Compliance
Included observations: 42  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -2.316578 1.251107 -1.851623 0.0717
LRGDPSH 0.605854 0.157478 3.847225 0.0004
CONC 0.533168 0.716856 0.74376 0.4615
R-squared 0.220763
Adjusted R-squared 0.180802Appendix D:Growth, Crises, and Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Included observations: 57
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.245654 4.293045 0.988961 0.3272
LRGDPSH -0.269073 0.629524 -0.427422 0.6708
LSCHOOL80 0.628577 0.988573 0.635843 0.5276





Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 11.70521 4.709893 2.485238 0.0169
LRGDPSH -0.781706 0.623713 -1.253311 0.2169
LSCHOOL80 0.076753 0.988675 0.077633 0.9385
ASSASS -0.331624 0.425229 -0.77987 0.4397
REVC -1.018606 1.369343 -0.743865 0.461
CIVIL -0.445974 0.215055 -2.073773 0.0441
TRADE 0.009816 0.00552 1.778443 0.0824
GOV -0.115538 0.05753 -2.0083 0.0509
PI -0.016564 0.007572 -2.187579 0.0342
CONC -0.93967 1.608478 -0.584198 0.5621
R-squared 0.365541
Adjusted R-squared 0.232747Appendix D (continued):Growth, Crises, and Bank Concentration
Dependent Variable: MAJOR CRISIS
Method: ML - Binary Logit
Included observations: 57
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 8.365588 3.664442 2.282909 0.0224
LRGDPSH -0.625657 0.377425 -1.657699 0.0974
CONC -4.308125 1.502555 -2.8672 0.0041
Probability(LR stat) 0.004885
Obs with Dep=1 26
Obs with Dep=0 31
Dependent Variable: MAJOR CRISIS
Method: ML - Binary Logit
Included observations: 56
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.631972 3.801539 1.218447 0.2231
LRGDPSH -0.211837 0.380968 -0.55605 0.5782
GOV -0.080145 0.069353 -1.155601 0.2478
PI 0.047906 0.02439 1.964189 0.0495
TRADE -0.00438 0.005853 -0.748306 0.4543
CONC -2.549007 1.908537 -1.335582 0.1817
Probability(LR stat) 0.002164
Obs with Dep=1 25
Obs with Dep=0 31Figure 1:
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